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Only one of Ralph Brown's many works on intellectual property law
begins with a literary reference. He introduced a 1984 article on copyright
protection for derivative works with a quotation from William Butler
Yeats's The Second Coming:
Turning and turning in the widening gyre
The falcon cannot hear the falconer;
Things fall apart; the center cannot hold
Mere anarchy is loosed upon the world .....
Ralph called it "one of the noblest poems of this century," 2 and his
fondness for it is revealing. Ralph devoted much of his career to holding the
center. He worried that intellectual property law had begun to lean too far
toward private rights at the expense of the public interest in access and
competition. "Competition is copying," 3 and laws that restrain copying-
copyright, patent, trademark, and comers of unfair competition law-
restrain competition. They exist as exceptions to a fundamental proposition,
expressed by Justice Brandeis in language that Ralph enthusiastically
repeated in at least three articles (and twice more in our casebook on
copyright law):4 "The general rule of law is, that the noblest of human
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1. W.B. YEATS, The Second Coming, in THE COLLECTED POEMS OF W.B. YEATS 184
(1956), quoted in Ralph S. Brown, The Widening Gyre: Are Derivative Works Getting out of
Hand?, 3 CARDozo ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1 (1984) [hereinafter The Widening Gyre].
2. Brown, The Widening Gyre, supra note 1, at 1.
3. Ralph S. Brown, The Joys of Copyright, YALE L. REP., Fall-Winter 1982-1983, at 22,
reprinted in 30 J. COPYRIGHT Soc'Y U.S.A. 477, 481 (1983) [hereinafter Brown, The Joys of
Copyright].
4. See, e.g., RALPH S. BROWN & ROBERT C. DENICOLA, CASES ON COPYRIGHT, UNFAIR
COMPETITION, AND RELATED TOPICS BEARING ON THE PROTECTION OF LITERARY, MUSICAL,
AND ARTISTIc WORKS 9, 595 (7th ed. 1998); Ralph S. Brown, Jr., Advertising and the Public
Interest: Legal Protection of Trade Symbols, 57 YALE L.J. 1165, 1200 (1948), reprinted in 108
YALE L.J. 1619, 1653 (1999) [hereinafter Brown, Advertising and the Public Interest]; Ralph S.
Brown, Eligibility for Copyright Protection: A Search for Principled Standards, 70 MINN. L.
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productions-knowledge, truths ascertained, conceptions, and ideas-
become, after voluntary communication to others, free as the air to common
use." 5 Exceptions require justification, and Ralph was old-fashioned
enough to believe that their scope should run no further than their rationale.
He systematically analyzed the rationales supporting private rights in
intellectual property and challenged any restraint on use that seemed to
spiral beyond legitimate justification. This Essay examines the central
theme of Ralph's scholarship: his passionate and influential defense of the
freedom to copy.
In recent years, Ralph had grown increasingly uneasy with the rapid
expansion of intellectual property rights. He sometimes speculated on the
conditions that fostered this trend and on the nature of an appropriate
response. His ideas are discussed in Part IV of this Essay.
I. TRADEMARK LAW
A. The Yale Article
In 1948, with his mind no doubt on tenure as much as trademarks,
Assistant Professor Ralph Brown undertook a formidable task in an article
published in The Yale Law Journal.6 At a time when economic analysis of
law was largely confined to tax, antitrust, and rules governing regulated
industries,7 he set out to formulate a normative theory of trademark law
based on recent economic studies of modem advertising.' The connection
between trademarks and advertising was undisputed. The ability of a firm to
capture the benefits of a favorable reputation generated by investments in
advertising depends directly on the degree of protection afforded to the
symbols that consumers use to identify the firm and its products. "Trade
symbols are a species of advertising," 9 Ralph argued, and the scope of their
REv. 579, 602 (1985) [hereinafter Brown, Eligibility for Copyright]; Ralph S. Brown, Jr.,
Unification: A Cheerful Requiem for Common Law Copyright, 24 UCLA L. REV. 1070, 1096
(1977) [hereinafter Brown, Unification].
5. International News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 250 (1918) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting).
6. See Brown, Advertising and the Public Interest, supra note 4.
7. See RIcHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 2.1 (5th ed. 1998).
8. Ralph's interest in economics as well as his dedication to teaching are illustrated by an
episode recalled by Professor Charles Alan Wright.
My last year at Yale was 1948-1949. I think it was probably prior to the fall semester
that Ralph Brown let it be known that he would be willing to offer a non-credit course
[on the principles of economics] for law-journal students.... I was one of the fairly
good-sized group to sign up for it. I think we met once or twice a week at 8:00, since at
that time regular courses did not start at Yale until 9:00. 1 thought it was splendid.
E-mail from Charles Alan Wright to Robert C. Denicola (Sept. 23, 1998) (on file with The Yale
Law Journal).
9. Brown, Advertising and the Public Interest, supra note 4, at 1185; see also William M.
Landes & Richard A. Posner, Trademark Law: An Economic Perspective, 30 J.L. & ECON. 265,
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protection should be set with reference to the economic effects of
advertising. On the latter, influenced principally by the work of Edward
Chamberlain, 0 he took a decidedly cynical view. To the extent that it
provides information to consumers, advertising contributes to the efficient
operation of the market. To the extent that it does not, Ralph believed that
advertising wastes resources in sterile competition and, worse, generates
irrational consumer preferences that foster monopoly. The implications for
trademark law were clear. When trademarks assist consumers in identifying
the goods of particular sellers, they support the informational function of
advertising. Any unauthorized use that subverts this function by causing
confusion about the source of a product should be stopped. Protection
beyond the prevention of confusion, however, is not only unnecessary but
counterproductive; it shields the selling power or "commercial
magnetism" " of a mark, facilitating product differentiation and monopoly.
For Ralph, the prevention of confusion was thus the defining rationale for
the protection of trademarks; additional restrictions on imitation were
unjustified intrusions into the competitive process.
Investigations into the economics of advertising published during the
first two decades following Ralph's article in The Yale Law Journal
generally supported his views. 2 By the 1970s, however, a view more
favorable to advertising had gained ground. George Stigler, for example,
emphasized that advertising contributes to efficiency by offering
information that reduces a buyer's search costs, 3 although Ralph had no
quarrel with such informative advertising. Philip Nelson went further,
arguing that much of what Ralph called "persuasive" advertising also
provides useful information to consumers. 4 Sellers get a bigger economic
return from advertising that generates repeat sales, and thus the volume of
advertising for a product can be a useful guide to the level of consumer
satisfaction that the product has achieved. 5 By 1987, William Landes and
274 (1987) ("[B]rand advertising presupposes trademarks-they are what enable a producer
readily to identify his brand to the consumer.").
10. See EDWARD HASTINGS CHAMBERLAIN, THE THEORY OF MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION:
A RE-ORIENTATION OF THE THEORY OF VALUE (5th ed. 1946), cited in Brown, Advertising and
the Public Interest, supra note 4, at 1171 n.29.
11. See Justice Frankfurter's famous comment in Mishawaka Rubber & Woolen
Manufacturing Co. v. S.S. Kresge Co., 316 U.S. 203, 205 (1942), used by Ralph as the
introduction to Advertising and the Public Interest, supra note 4, at 1165.
12. See, e.g., JOE S. BAIN, BARRIERS TO NEW COMPETITION: THEIR CHARACTER AND
CONSEQUENCES IN MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES (1956); JOE S. BAIN, INDUSTRIAL
ORGANIZATION (1959); Charles E. Mueller, Sources of Monopoly Power: A Phenomenon Called
'Product Differentiation,' 18 AM. U. L. REV. 1 (1968); A.G. Papandreou, The Economic Effect of
Trademarks, 44 CAL. L. REv. 503 (1956).
13. See GEORGE J. STIGLER, THE ORGANIZATION OF INDUSTRY 176, 182-90 (1968).
14. See Phillip J. Nelson, The Economic Value of Advertising, in ADVERTISING AND SOCIETY
43 (Yale Brozen ed., 1974).
15. Other defenses of modem advertising published during the 1970s include JULIAN L.
SIMON, ISSUES IN THE ECONOMICS OF ADVERTISING 205-06 (1970), which discounts the extent to
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Richard Posner could write "that the hostile view of brand advertising has
been largely and we think correctly rejected by economists." '
6
The young Ralph Brown undoubtedly understood that his appraisal of
modem advertising would not be the final word. His principal achievement
was to win acceptance for a mode of analysis that tied the protection of
trademarks to their economic role in the marketplace. He had demonstrated
that any extension of trademark protection beyond the limits of the
confusion rationale was at least debatable, 7 and after the publication of his
article any case for expanded protection required more than unadorned
allusions to property rights and unjust enrichment. In the decades that
followed, as the debate over the scope of trademark protection played out
on several fronts, Ralph fought to retain consumer confusion as the
touchstone for excluding copiers.
B. Dilution
One protracted conflict over trademark rights had begun only a year
before publication of Ralph's Yale article. In 1947, Massachusetts became
the first state to pass a "dilution" statute. The act and its rationale directly
challenged Ralph's views on the appropriate scope of trademark
protection." As Ralph recognized, aggressive promotion can invest a mark
with considerable power to stimulate sales. In an effort to induce courts to
prohibit the use of a mark even on goods that did not compete with those of
the trademark owner, Frank Schechter had argued years earlier that the
which advertising induces consumption; and Yale Brozen, New FTC Policy from Obsolete
Economic Doctrine, 41 ANTITRUST LJ. 477 (1972), which argues that advertising does not create
barriers to entry.
16. Landes & Posner, supra note 9, at 275. But see Andy Bearne, The Economics of
Advertising: A Reappraisal, 1 ECON. ISSUES 23, 36 (1996) (concluding, after a review of the
literature, "that advertising has both pro- and anti-competitive influences and there is much left to
understand about its role within the competitive process").
17. The Supreme Court invoked Ralph's article to illustrate that the proper scope of
trademark protection remained controversial. See Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., 344 U.S. 280, 283
n.7 (1952); FTC v. Borden Co., 383 U.S. 637, 649 n.3 (1966) (Stewart, J., dissenting); cf S.C.
Johnson & Son, Inc. v. Johnson, 175 F.2d 176, 183 (2d Cir. 1949) (Clark, J., dissenting). The
article's distinction between the informative and persuasive functions of trademarks was adopted
in Prudential Insurance Co. v. Gibraltar Financial Corp., 694 F.2d 1150, 1153 (9th Cir. 1982).
See also Smith v. Chanel, Inc., 402 F.2d 562, 566 n.14 (9th Cir. 1968) (citing Ralph's description
of the informational function of trademarks); 880 Stores v. Martinez, 361 P.2d 809, 817 (Or.
1961) (citing Ralph's views on the anticompetitive consequences of trademark protection). The
article is still cited as a leading statement of the case for limited trademark protection. See, e.g.,
PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT, PATENT, TRADEMARK AND RELATED STATE DocTRINEs: CASES
AND MATERIALS ON THE LAW OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 24 (4th ed. 1997); EDMUND W.
KITCH & HARVEY S. PERLMAN, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND UNFAIR COMPETITION 171 (5th
ed. 1998).
18. See Brown, Advertising and the Public Interest, supra note 4, at 1191-94. The
Massachusetts statute is quoted id. at 1194 n.121. See also Food Fair Stores v. Food Fair, Inc., 83
F. Supp. 445, 450 (D. Mass. 1948) (noting that the Massachusetts dilution statute rejects the views
expressed by Professor Brown).
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primary value of a trademark is its capacity to generate sales and that it
should be protected against the "gradual whittling away or dispersion of the
identity and hold upon the public mind of the mark...." '9 Ralph, of
course, emphatically disagreed-far from deserving protection, this
"persuasive" power might be better diluted through nonconfusing uses of
the mark by others.2" The common law never adopted Schechter's dilution
rationale, instead extending protection against noncompeting uses only
when they threatened to confuse consumers.2 ' The dilution statutes,
however, gave direct recognition to the selling power of a mark by
prohibiting any use that imperiled its "distinctive quality"-that is, its
unique connection with the trademark owner and its products.
Dilution protection received a boost when the U.S. (now International)
Trademark Association, a private organization of trademark owners, added
a dilution provision to the 1964 revision of its Model State Trademark Act,
which serves as the basis for most state trademark registration statutes.22
More than half of the states now have dilution laws.' Influenced perhaps
by Ralph and other skeptics, courts initially gave the statutes a cool
reception.24 In the 1980s, however, judges began to take the dilution statutes
at face value, extending protection against even nonconfusing uses that
threatened to dilute the association between the mark and the trademark
owner. To economists who saw more good than bad in brand promotion
and product differentiation, protection against dilution was sound policy. A
nonconfusing use of a well-known mark to denote the products of a
different seller can reduce the mark's capacity to communicate information.
to consumers by blurring the connotations developed through the prior
user's promotional investments.'
The futile effort to hold trademark rights within the confines of the
confusion rationale reached its conclusion in 1996, when an amendment to
the Lanham Act created a federal cause of action for the owners of
19. Frank I. Schechter, The Rational Basis of Trademark Protection, 40 HARV. L. REV. 813,
825 (1927).
20. Cf Brown, Advertising and the Public Interest, supra note 4, at 1191 (using "Gold
Medal" as an example).
21. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 25 cmt. b (1995).
22. The 1964 and 1992 versions of the Model State Trademark Act are reprinted in 3 J.
THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPEITION §§ 22:8-22:9
(4th ed. 1998).
23. See id. § 22:5.
24. The early history of the dilution statutes is recounted in Beverly W. Pattishall, The
Dilution Rationale for Trademark-Trade Identity Protection, Its Progress and Prospects, 71
Nw. U. L. REV. 618 (1976).
25. See Landes & Posner, supra note 9, at 307 (justifying rules against dilution by arguing
that they prevent the creation of distracting and inappropriate associations that reduce the
communicative value of the symbol, adding that others "who believe that 'product differentiation'
is a bad thing because it creates artificial barriers to entry will not applaud such a result, but this
view is no longer widespread among economists").
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"famous" marks against unauthorized use that "causes dilution of the
distinctive quality of the mark ....26 Even before the enactment of the
federal dilution law, however, Ralph and others had begun to stake out a
new line of defense against the expansion of trademark protection under the
dilution rationale. It was one thing to offer protection against the use of a
well-known mark as a trademark on someone else's goods, but another to
prohibit uses intended to identify the trademark owner or its products as the
subject of the user's speech. Examples of the latter include use of another's
mark in comparative advertising or in parodies directed at the trademark
owner or its products. Although state dilution statutes have sometimes been
invoked to protect a mark from use as a trademark on goods that might
tarnish the positive associations that the mark evokes,27 in a few instances
this protection has extended to cases in which the tarnishing results, not
from the use of the mark as a trademark for another's goods, but from its
use in speech directed at the trademark owner. s The extension of rights
against such "nontrademark" use has become the new battleground.
The economic arguments that favor protecting a mark against even
nonconfusing use as a trademark for someone else's goods do not easily
extend to other kinds of nonconfusing use. If the symbol is not used as a
trademark to denote the goods of a different seller, the exclusive association
between the mark and the first user is not diluted. Although the
communicative value of the symbol may still be reduced if the use tarnishes
the positive associations evoked by the mark, there is no reason to presume
that any such harm will outweigh the harm caused by impeding the
communication of potentially valuable information about the trademark
owner or its products.29 If the speaker's message is not commercial, the full
weight of the First Amendment is also in the balance.
The proper interpretation of state dilution statutes was a contentious
issue in the drafting of the Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition,
26. Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-98, 109 Stat. 985 (1996) (to be
codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1125(c), 1127) (defining "dilution"). Ralph, of course, opposed federal
dilution protection and testified against an earlier dilution proposal at congressional hearings in
1988. See House Panel Hears Views on Trademark Act Revision, 36 Pat. Trademark & Copyright
J. (BNA) 489,490 (Sept. 15, 1988).
27. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETmON § 25 cmt. g (1995).
28. See, e.g., Deere & Co. v. MTD Prods., 41 F.3d 39 (2d Cir. 1994) (enjoining a parody of
the plaintiffs mark in a competitor's comparative advertisement); Anheuser-Busch v. Balducci
Publications, 28 F.3d 769 (8th Cir. 1994) (enjoining the use of the plaintiff's trademarks in a
parody advertisement alluding to environmental problems). Other decisions show greater
reluctance to apply the dilution statutes against defendants who have not adopted the plaintiff's
mark as a trademark for their own goods. See, e.g., L.L. Bean v. Drake Publishers, 811 F.2d 26
(1st Cir. 1987) (denying relief against the use of the plaintiff's trademarks in a parody of its sales
catalogue).
29. See Landes & Posner, supra note 9, at 307 (distinguishing the use of a mark as a
trademark to denote the defendant's own products from a use that instead refers back to the
products of the trademark owner).
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published by the American Law Institute (ALI) in 1995. As a member of
the Advisers Committee, Ralph took the lead in arguing for a narrow
construction." As promulgated by the ALI, Section 25 of the Restatement
interprets state dilution statutes as extending only to uses that dilute the
connection between the mark and its owner by associating the symbol with
the products of a different seller.3" Under the rule in Section 25(2), the use
of a mark "to comment on, criticize, ridicule, parody, or disparage" the
owner or its products or business is beyond the reach of the dilution
rationale; relief for injuries caused by these "nontrademark" uses is left to
the rules governing liability for injurious speech, principally the actions for
defamation and disparagement.32 The federal dilution statute, enacted soon
after publication of the Restatement, offers protection against a use that
"causes dilution of the distinctive quality of the mark," with "dilution"
defined as "the lessening of the capacity of a famous mark to identify and
distinguish goods or services." 33 With protection linked to the identification
function of a mark, the federal statute seems confined to unauthorized use
as a trademark for goods originating from a different seller; a use that
instead refers back to the trademark owner will not threaten the mark's
capacity to identify the owner or its goods.' It is too early to tell whether
this new defensive line will hold.
C. Ornamental Use
Ralph's Yale article also recognized a threat more insidious than the
dilution statutes. A standard of liability resting on the probability of
confusion among a universe of hypothetical purchasers is subject to
effortless manipulation. Factual assumptions and legal presumptions,
carefully orchestrated, can expand the scope of trademark protection
beyond anything envisioned by the conservative model that Ralph
endorsed. One such expansion grew out of the increasing popularity in the
1970s of clothing, jewelry, mugs, and other assorted merchandise that
display the names, logos, or mascots of athletic teams, musical groups,
fraternal organizations, and commercial purveyors, especially of beers and
soft drinks. As famous names and marks became valuable as ornamentation
on everything from sweatshirts to toilet seats, the question naturally arose
30. Ralph's Yale article, Advertising and the Public Interest, supra note 4, is cited in
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETIION § 25 reporters' note b (1995).
3 1. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETTON § 25(1) (1995).
32. See id. § 25(2).
33. 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1125(c), 1127 (West 1998).
34. The legislative history of the Federal Trademark Dilution Act, read in light of earlier
attempts at federal dilution protection, supports this interpretation. See Robert C. Denicola, Some
Thoughts on the Dynamics of Federal Trademark Legislation and the Trademark Dilution Act of
1995, LAW & CONTENP. PROBS., Spring 1996, at 75, 88-90.
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whether a seller needed anyone's permission to emblazon a tee-shirt with
the words "New York Yankees," "Yale University," or a picture of a
Budweiser beer can. When the owners of famous trademarks pressed their
claims, a few courts, especially the Fifth Circuit in Boston Professional
Hockey Ass'n v. Dallas Cap & Emblem Manufacturing,35 gave them
exclusive rights in the new markets through the simple expedient of
equating consumer recognition of the mark with confusion of sponsorship.
Other courts, however, took the requirement of confusion more seriously,
denying relief when consumers were unlikely to infer sponsorship from a
decorative use of a famous mark.36
There is more than a little circularity in basing a legal right to control
unauthorized ornamental use on the assumptions that consumers make
about the official sponsorship of the ornamented items-assumptions that
rest in turn on consumers' views about whether trademark owners have the
legal right to control such use. If trademark owners win enough high-profile
cases or brag loudly enough about licensing revenues from ornamental use,
consumers will naturally think that the products they see must be licensed,
which in turn will help insure that a license is indeed required. In some
product markets such as professional sports paraphernalia, trademark
owners' rights now seem well-secured.3
Ralph was unhappy with this self-actuated expansion of trademark
rights, although I think his displeasure was eased by the knowledge that
colleges and universities were among the principal beneficiaries of the new
licensing revenues. When we included the Boston Hockey decision in our
casebook, Ralph, contrary to usual practice, insisted on a disclaimer
warning students that "Boston Hockey has been distinguished and limited
in later decisions for its loose interpretation of the confusion
35. 510 F.2d 1004 (5th Cir. 1975); see also Boston Athletic Ass'n v. Sullivan, 867 F.2d 22,
34 (1st Cir. 1989) (presuming confusion of sponsorship among tee-shirt buyers).
36. See, e.g., Supreme Assembly, Order of Rainbow for Girls v. J.H. Ray Jewelry Co., 676
F.2d 1079, 1084-85 (5th Cir. 1982) (holding that the defendant's use of the plaintiffs insignia as
an element of jewelry did not infringe the plaintiffs trademark rights in the insignia, and
distinguishing its earlier decision in Boston Hockey); International Order of Job's Daughters v.
Lindeburg & Co., 633 F.2d 912 (9th Cir. 1980) (holding similarly that the use of the plaintiff's
insignia as an element of jewehy was not an infringement); University of Pittsburgh v. Champion
Prods., 566 F. Supp. 711, 722 (W.D. Pa. 1983) (holding that the use of a university's trademarks
on clothing did not constitute infringement); Bi-Rite Enters. v. Button Master, 555 F. Supp. 1188,
1196 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (holding that the use of performers' likeness on novelty items was not
infringement); see also BROWN & DENICOLA, supra note 4, at 689 (discussing merchandising
rights).
37. Consumer surveys presented by the National Football League in cases such as National
Football League Properties v. Wichita Falls Sportswear, 532 F. Supp. 651 (,V.D. Wash. 1982),
and National Football League Properties, Inc. v. Dallas Cap & Emblem Mfg., Inc., 327 N.E.2d
247, 250 (IlM. App. 1975), indicate that most consumers believe professional football merchandise
is sponsored by the NFL or its teams.
38. See BROWN & DENICOLA, supra note 4, at 691.
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requirement." 9 The Restatement merely reiterates the likelihood of
confusion standards as the basis of liability for ornamental use.n0 Ralph, I
suspect, wished that it did more.
D. Secondary Meaning in the Making
There have been other battles over trademark rights in the half-century
since the publication of Advertising and the Public Interest, and Ralph was
an active combatant in most of them. One minor skirmish started in 1974
when courts in the Southern District of New York began to hint that
protection might be available even for a symbol that did not yet identify a
particular source, as long as it seemed to be in the process of acquiring
source association-so-called "secondary meaning in the making." 41 This
sort of protection could not be justified under the confusion rationale for the
simple and sufficient reason that if a symbol is not associated with a
particular producer, its use by others cannot confuse consumers about the
source of a product. For the same reason, there is no obvious economic
argument for protection since there is little or no informational value in a
nondistinctive symbol. In the 1985 edition of our casebook on copyright
law, Ralph said the whole idea was "heresy";42 in the 1986 Brace
Memorial Lecture to the Copyright Society of the U.S.A., he called it "a
crashing solecism."' 3 By 1987, the gloves were off: "WThere is a notion at
large called 'secondary meaning in the making.' It should be stamped
out." 44
As an adviser on the Restatement, Ralph made certain that it did not
equivocate: "The doctrine, if taken literally, is inimical to the purpose of
the secondary meaning requirement."' 5 The issue was put to rest in 1992
when Judge Oakes, writing for the Second Circuit, flatly rejected secondary
meaning in the making in Laureyssens v. Idea Group, Inc.4' After quoting
from a tentative draft of the Restatement, he added that the doctrine
39. Id. at 578.
40. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 20 cmts. b, e & reporters' notes
b, e (1995).
41. See, e.g., Jolly Good Indus. v. Elegra Inc., 690 F. Supp. 227, 231 (S.D.N.Y. 1988); Metro
Kane Imports v. Federated Dept. Stores, 625 F. Supp. 313, 317 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); National
Lampoon, Inc. v. ABC, 376 F. Supp. 733,747 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
42. RALPH S. BROWN & ROBERT C. DENICOLA, CASES ON COPYRIGHT, UNFAIR
COMPETITION, AND OTHER ToPics BEARING ON THE PROTECTION OF LITERARY, MUSICAL, AND
ARTISTIc WORKS 532 (4th ed. 1985).
43. Ralph S. Brown, Copyright and Its Upstart Cousins: Privacy, Publicity, Unfair
Competition, 33 J. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y U.S.A. 301, 311 (1986) (transcript of the Sixteenth Donald
C. Brace Memorial Lecture) [hereinafter Brown, Copyright and Its Upstart Cousins].
44. Ralph S. Brown, Design Protection: An Overview, 34 UCLA L. REV. 1341, 1374 (1987)
[hereinafter Brown, Design Protection].
45. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 13 cmt. e (1995).
46. 964 F.2d 131 (2d Cir. 1992).
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"constrains unnecessarily the freedom to copy and compete."'47 The latter
remark sounds like pure Ralph Brown, which perhaps it was-as a
Restatement adviser himself, Judge Oakes by 1992 had been listening to
Ralph's views on trademarks for more than five years.
E. Design Protection
A more substantial controversy developed from the increasingly
frequent attempts by manufacturers to claim trademark protection for the
design features of their products. Labels, packaging, and other aspects of a
product's "trade dress" can be protected as a trademark if they become
distinctive of a particular source, and the principle has sometimes been
extended to the appearance of the product itself. By the 1960s, -it was
apparent that trademark protection for product designs could short-circuit
the stringent limitations embedded in federal patent and copyright law. For
a time it appeared that the Supreme Court had arrested this development, at
least under state law, with its companion decisions in Sears, Roebuck & Co.
v. Stiffel Co.48 and Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 49 which
invoked the Supremacy Clause 0 to bar state protection for product features.
In a Columbia Law Review symposium on the decisions, Ralph gave them
enthusiastic support as a proper rebuff to cases that reflected "a persistent
urge to create some general protection against copiers."5" The preemption
argument in Sears and Compco, however, could not deter trademark
protection for product features under federal law, and eventually, even state
trademark protection seemed to win a quiet reprieve."
If trademark protection could reach to product designs, Ralph wanted it
kept on a tight leash. In his 1986 Brace Memorial Lecture, he set the issue:
"The problem is this: protection of industrial design, unless kept firmly tied
to source recognition as a trademark, easily slides into an unpredictable
system of monopoly awards for successful designs, uninhibited by the
statutory standards of copyright law or design patent law." 53 A year later he
staked out his position in a major article published in the UCLA Law
Review.54 Ralph argued that two hornbook rules, vigilantly applied, could
47. Id. at 138.
48. 376 U.S. 225 (1964).
49. 376 U.S. 234 (1964).
50. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
51. Ralph S. Brown, Jr., Product Simulation: A Right or a Wrong, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 1216,
1227 (1964) [hereinafter Brown, Product Simulation]. Ralph's analysis was invoked by Judge
Friendly in Ives Laboratories v. Darby Drug Co., 601 F.2d 631, 640 (2d Cir. 1979).
52. See Bonito Boats v. Thunder Craft Boats, 489 U.S. 141 (1989). The impact of Bonito
Boats on state trademark protection for product features is discussed in RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 16 cmt. e (1995).
53. Brown, Copyright and Its Upstart Cousins, supra note 43, at 309.
54. See Brown, Design Protection, supra note 44. The Supreme Court cited this article in
1670 [Vol. 108: 1661
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hold trademark protection for product designs within tolerable bounds.
Design features should be protected only when genuinely distinctive of a
particular source, and in no event should protection extend to "functional"
features. Ralph believed that timid application of these limiting principles
had already disadvantaged both competitors and consumers.'
The rule prohibiting trademark protection for functional features is
longstanding.56 Functional features are elements that are costly for
competitors to forego. No toothpaste manufacturer can claim trademark
rights in a squeezable tube, even if it originated the idea. On the other hand,
if there are a variety of perfectly good substitutes for a design feature,
trademark protection will not unduly hinder competition.Y Ralph's
particular concern related to the recognition of trademark rights in features
valued for their aesthetic rather than their utilitarian advantages. If
functionality is about insuring effective competition, then trademark law
should deny protection to a heart-shaped candy box used for Valentine's
Day chocolates, despite the absence of any utilitarian advantage. This
concept of "aesthetic functionality" had already made several cautious
appearances. Although Ralph did not offer his own formulation, he was
critical of the parsimonious interpretations he found in the case law, and he
pushed for more robust recognition.s
Ralph also believed that the element of distinctiveness-the
requirement that the subject matter convey source information to
Bonito Boats, 489 U.S. at 167, when it refused to allow the states to offer "patent-like" protection
to product designs and invalidated a state statute prohibiting the use of a direct molding process to
duplicate boat hulls. The article has also been cited by appeals courts in at least four circuits. See
Vomado Air Circulation Sys. v. Duracraft Corp., 58 F.3d 1498, 1505 (10th Cir. 1995); Duraco
Prods. v. Joy Plastic Enters., 40 F.3d 1431, 1446, 1453 (3d Cir. 1994); Kohler Co. v. Moen Inc.,
12 F.3d 632, 648-49 (7th Cir. 1993); Coach Leatherware Co. v. AnnTaylor, Inc., 933 F.2d 162,
171 (2d Cir. 1991).
55. Ralph grudgingly acknowledged his willingness to support a "little statutory monopoly"
in the form of sui generis design protection if necessary to spur investment in innovative design,
but only if the statutory rights were short and well-defined, exclusive of other forms of protection,
and plainly excluded utilitarian attributes. Brown, Copyright and Its Upstart Cousins, supra note
43, at 320; see also Brown, Design Protection, supra note 44, at 1395-1403 (offering suggestions
on proposed design legislation). Overcoming their earlier defeat under state law, see Bonito Boats,
489 U.S. at 141, boat designers became the first beneficiaries of sui generis design protection in
1998 when the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998),
added chapter 13 to Title 17. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1332. The statute's generalized form invites
future expansion.
56. See RESTATEMENT OF TORTs § 742 (1938).
57. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 17 (1995). Landes & Posner,
supra note 9, at 297, define a nonfunctional feature as "one with perfect (or nearly perfect)
substitutes."
58. See Brown, Design Protection, supra note 44, at 1359-74 (discussing the existing
precedents on aesthetic functionality); see also Brown, Copyright and Its Upstart Cousins, supra
note 43, at 311-13 (cautioning against trademark rights that protect the selling power of a
product's pleasant appearance). The economic arguments favoring the recognition of aesthetic
functionality parallel those supporting utilitarian functionality. See Landes & Posner, supra note
9, at 297.
The Yale Law Journal
consumers-had been applied to product features with too little rigor. For
word marks, trademark law has long recognized that the distinctiveness
requirement can be satisfied in two different ways. Fanciful or arbitrary
terms like "Kodak" on cameras or "Arrow" on shirts are considered
"inherently distinctive."59 The absence of any other apparent relevance
makes it likely that these terms will be understood by consumers as
attempts to indicate source. In addition, the recognition of trademark rights
will likely not inhibit fair competition by others. Descriptive terms like
"Vision Center" for an optical clinic are more problematic since they might
be understood by consumers only in a descriptive sense, and the recognition
of trademark rights has greater anticompetitive consequences. For these
terms, protection is appropriate only when their informational value as a
source identifier exceeds the anticompetitive consequences of precluding
their use by others. The law thus demands proof that the descriptive term
has in fact become a trademark-that is, that the term has acquired a
"secondary meaning" as an indicator of source.6°
In the 1980s, judges began to apply the idea of inherent distinctiveness
to the appearance of labels, packaging, and related subject matter.61 The
wide range of alternative designs for labels and packaging generally insures
that trademark rights will not unduly hinder competition, and Ralph was not
alarmed by this development, "if the standards for instant protection are
kept high."'62 But invoking inherent distinctiveness to justify trademark
rights in the design of the product itself was another matter. Here the
competitive interest in copying is greater (and the likelihood of actual
source association seems smaller) than for labels and packaging, and Ralph
believed that the freedom to copy should give way only in the face of
proven source significance. "To say that the overall design of a useful
article is 'inherently distinctive' of a particular source just by examining
it .... substitutes an impression that the design is outstanding, or eccentric,
or clever, or something, for the proofs of association with a source" that
show real secondary meaning.63
Ralph's position suffered a setback in 1992 when the Supreme Court in
Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc.' upheld a judgment against a
restaurant that had copied the Mexican motif of a competitor. The Court
held that proof of secondary meaning is not required to prevail on a claim
for trade dress infringement under Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act if the
59. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPEnTION § 13 cmt. c (1995).
60. kla § 14 cmt. a.
61. See, e.g., Blau Plumbing, Inc. v. S.O.S. Fix-It, Inc., 781 F.2d 604 (7th Cir. 1986);
Chevron Chem. Co. v. Voluntary Purchasing Groups, Inc., 659 F.2d 695 (5th Cir. Unit A Oct.
1981).
62. Brown, Design Protection, supra note 44, at 1374.
63. Id. at 1380.
64. 505 U.S. 763 (1992).
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trade dress is inherently distinctive.' Justice White drew no distinction
between packaging and product features, and he specifically rejected
several Second Circuit decisions that had made proof of secondary meaning
a prerequisite to protecting product designs as trademarks.66 Ralph
complained that the concept of an inherently distinctive product design was
even more harmful than the idea of secondary meaning in the making since
it eliminated all concern over secondary meaning whenever the design was
somehow distant from the common prototype.67
Subsequent developments seem to justify Ralph's concern. For word
marks, the use of broad categories determinative of inherent distinctiveness
avoids the administrative costs of a case-by-case balancing of the
informational advantages and competitive disadvantages of protection.6S It
also affords a degree of predictability, valued both in decisions to adopt and
decisions to imitate a putative trademark. The category of inherently
distinctive product designs, however, has so far done little to further either
interest. Disputes over the appropriate standard for inherent distinctiveness
continue to consume public and private resources.69 Factors relevant under
some formulations, including the user's intent and comparisons with the
universe of existing designs, add to the cost and complexity of the
determination, and outcomes remain difficult to predict under any version
of the standard.
Ralph made another valuable suggestion about trademark protection for
product designs. Trademark law does not forbid copying; it forbids conduct
likely to confuse consumers about source or sponsorship. Proper respect for
the requirements of those laws that do forbid copying (patent and
copyright) suggests that when subject matters overlap, the protection of
trademark rights should be pursued primarily through mandatory labeling
and similar precautionary measures rather than injunctions against
copying."
65. See id. at 767.
66. See id. at 773-74.
67. See RALPH S. BROWN & ROBERT C. DENICOLA, CASES ON COPYRIGHT, UNFAIR
COMPETITION, AND OTHER TOPICS BEARING ON THE PROTECTION OF LITERARY, MUSICAL, AND
ARTISTIC WORKS 667 (6th ed. 1995).
68. See Landes & Posner, supra note 9, at 289.
69. See, e.g., Landscape Forms, Inc. v. Columbia Cascade Co., 113 F.3d 373, 378 (2d Cir.
1997) (considering "whether the design was likely to be understood as an indicator of the
product's source"); Knitwaves, Inc. v. Lollytogs Ltd., 71 F.3d 996, 1009 (2d Cir. 1995)
(considering whether the design "was primarily aesthetic" or "primarily intended as source
identification"); Stuart Hall Co. v. Ampad Corp., 51 F.3d 780 (8th Cir. 1995) (applying the
traditional categories of distinctiveness applicable to word marks); Duraco Prods. v. Joy Plastic
Enters., 40 F.3d 1431, 1434 (3d Cir. 1994) (discussing whether the product feature is: "(i) unusual
and memorable; (ii) conceptually separable from the product; and (iii) likely to serve primarily as
a designator of origin of the product"); Krueger Int'l v. Nightingale Inc., 915 F. Supp. 595, 603
(S.D.N.Y. 1996) (adopting the test in Seabrook Foods v. Bar-Well Foods, 568 F.2d 1342, 1344
(C.C.P.A. 1977), inquiring whether the design is "unique, unusual or unexpected in the market").
70. See Brown, Design Protection, supra note 44, at 1385.
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The Restatement reflects the concerns of Ralph and others on all these
matters. In its section 16 on trademark protection for packaging and product
features, the commentary cautions that "[r]igorous application of the
requirements of distinctiveness and nonfunctionality is necessary in order to
avoid undermining the carefully circumscribed statutory regimes for the
protection of useful and ornamental designs under federal patent and
copyright law."71 Section 17 includes an endorsement of aesthetic
functionality as a limitation on trademark rights in product designs, and the
adoption of that analysis by the Second Circuit seems to have firmly
secured its place in the case law.7' Ralph also pressed his argument that
product features should not be assimilated with packaging and word
marks." In the wake of the Supreme Court's decision in Two Pesos, the
Restatement could not advance a strict requirement of secondary meaning
for product features. It does caution, however, that as distinguished from
packaging, "it is less common for consumers to recognize the design of a
product or product feature as an indication of source. Product designs are
more likely to be seen merely as utilitarian or ornamental aspects of the
goods." 74 In light of the competitive interest in copying, "[p]roduct designs
are therefore not ordinarily considered inherently distinctive and are thus
normally protected only upon proof of secondary meaning."7 5 The
Restatement also endorses Ralph's observation on remedies in product-
design cases, concluding that "the public interest in access may in some
cases influence the choice of appropriate relief by encouraging
consideration of alternatives to an injunction against imitation, such as
mandatory labeling or other precautionary measures."76
71. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 16 cmt. b (1995).
72. See Wallace Int'l Silversmiths v. Godinger Silver Art Co., 916 F.2d 76 (2d Cir. 1990)
(adopting the analysis of aesthetic functionality in RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR
COMPETITION § 17 (Preliminary Draft No. 3, 1989)).
Ralph would have preferred a different name for the concept, fearing that "aesthetic
functionality" as a term "implies appraisals of aesthetic worth that courts should and usually do
shy away from." Memorandum from Ralph Brown to the Advisers, Restatement (Third) of Unfair
Competition (Nov. 27, 1988) (on file at the American Law Institute). He also thought that the
Restatement's formulation of functionality put too much emphasis on the availability of
alternatives. "You intone the privilege to copy. But if you have to find an alternative, you're not
being allowed to copy." Memorandum from Ralph Brown to the Reporters, Restatement (Third)
of Unfair Competition (Oct. 23, 1989) (on file at the American Law Institute).
73. See Memorandum from Ralph Brown to the Advisers, supra note 72; Memorandum from
Ralph Brown to the Reporters, supra note 72. Arguing that RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR
COMPETrION § 16 (Preliminary Draft No. 2, 1988) failed to distinguish adequately between
packaging and product features, Ralph commented: "I am tempted to record an impression that
our conscientious Reporter, both in his text and notes, is a little perfunctory in supporting the
privilege to imitate"-his gentle way of asserting that I had seen too many trees and too little
forest. Memorandum from Ralph Brown to the Advisers, supra note 72.
74. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 16 cmt. b (1995).
75. Id.
76. Id. cmt. a.
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II. COPYRIGHT LAW
Trademark law was Ralph's first interest, but in a luncheon speech
marking his "retirement" in 1983, he described how he came upon his
"favorite subject" and "longest love" -copyright law.77 It began in 1947
with a seminar on the antitrust problems of creative people in the
entertainment business prompted by litigation involving the Dramatists
Guild, but it soon expanded to the copyright law that lay behind so many
issues in the entertainment industry.78 The rest is history-a history that
includes a 1958 study on monetary remedies under copyright law prepared
at the request of the Register of Copyrights in connection with the revision
of the 1909 Copyright Act,79 the first casebook on copyright law (published
in 1960 with Professor Benjamin Kaplan and now in its seventh edition),8"
and a series of major articles touching almost every aspect of the subject.
In copyright law too, Ralph worried about "a certain escape from
control."8" He took as his text the Constitution, which authorizes Congress
"to Promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for
limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their
respective Writings and Discoveries." 2 He told the Copyright Society that
"the central stabilizing elements of copyright law.., in the Constitution,
are to encourage authorship and creativity, for the sake of increasing the
stock of knowledge and of art." " Ralph's most complete disquisition on the
77. Brown, The Joys of Copyright, supra note 3, at 477.
78. See id. For background on the Dramatists Guild litigation, see Ring v. Spina, 148 F.2d
647 (2d Cir. 1945); and Ring v. Authors' League of America, 186 F.2d 637 (2d. Cir. 1951).
79. See Ralph S. Brown, Jr., The Operation of the Damage Provisions of the Copyright Act:
An Exploratory Study, COPYRIGHT REVISION STUDY No. 23 (1958), reprinted in 2 STUDIES ON
COPYRIGHT 1067 (Arthur Fisher Memorial ed. 1963). The study was discussed by the Supreme
Court in Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517, 528 (1994). The legal realist in Ralph must have
been tested by his experience with 500 questionnaires on damage recoveries that he distributed in
connection with the study. Only 88 were returned, 30 of which indicated no relevant experiences.
See 2 STUDIES ON COPYRIGHT, supra, at 1072. (Ralph might have objected to the "legal realist"
label, but he certainly fit his own definition of the term, offered in Ralph S. Brown, Book Review,
6 LAWv & HIST. REv. 191, 193 (1988) (reviewing LAURA KALMAN, LEGAL REALISM AT YALE,
1927-1960 (1986)): "What did it mean, to be a [legal] realist? Did it require anything more than a
mistrust of conceptual thinking, a skepticism about orthodox descriptions of the judicial,
legislative, and administrative processes, and a willingness to experiment with teaching methods
that went beyond the austere Langdellian casebook? Adherence to these three attitudes, I think,
qualified one at least to pose as a legal realist, junior grade.").
80. See BENJAMIN KAPLAN & RALPH S. BROWN, JR., COPYRIGHT, UNFAIR COMPETITION,
AND OTHER TOPICS BEARING ON THE PROTECTION OF LITERARY, MUSICAL, AND ARTISTIC
WORKS (1960).
81. Brown, The Widening Gyre, supra note 1, at 1.
82. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
83. Brown, Copyright and Its Upstart Cousins, supra note 43, at 301-02. The constitutional
clause is the founding grant not only for copyright, but also for patent. Ralph had little to say
about patent law, except for design patents, which overlap with both copyright and trademark, and
the preemptive effect of patent law on state attempts to suppress copying. I suspect this followed
from his apparent disinterest in technology, including computers. He persisted in composing
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rationale for copyright came in a 1985 article published in the Minnesota
Law Review. 4 Copyright was "a way of promoting the general public
good"-not necessarily the good of authors and publishers." "The clause
does not say 'to maximize the returns to authors and inventors."' 8 6 Along
the way, and with a note of regret, he rejected arguments resting on a
natural right of authors to ownership of their creations. "Exaltation of
authorship, whatever its emotional appeal, is not, in itself, enough to justify
extending existing rights, even if it is likely that creating a new property
right will in fact shift resources in the authors' direction." 87
The public interest pursued by copyright law lies in the creation and
enjoyment of works of authorship-contributions that are often easy for
copiers to appropriate. Some degree of protection seems necessary to avoid
underproduction caused by prices bid down to the cost of copying.
Encouraging creativity through the recognition of exclusive rights,
however, imposes costs. Trading access for incentive restricts the
consumption of public goods and hence reduces consumer welfare. 8 It also
letters on an old typewriter, but even those smudged and poorly-typed notes were infinitely
preferable to his handwritten communications. (My wife, Christine, drew spontaneous applause at
a dinner in Ralph's honor when the participants learned of her ability to decipher his handwriting.)
Ralph also had little use for electronic media. Once in the 1980s, I had used Westlaw to find
citations for recent cases not yet published in the advance sheets and included the volume and
page numbers in the manuscript for our casebook. When the advance sheets eventually arrived at
Yale, Ralph telephoned in genuine amazement to ask how I had been able to "predict" where the
opinions would appear.
84. See Brown, Eligibility for Copyright, supra note 4. The article appeared as part of a
symposium, The Semiconductor Chip Protection Act of 1984 and Its Lessons, 70 MINN. L. REV.
263 (1985). It was an odd forum for Ralph, who not surprisingly headed for higher ground with a
contribution that did not discuss a single provision of the Semiconductor Act.
85. Id. at 592.
86. Id. In a later article, Ralph quoted from a contribution in the same symposium coauthored
by Congressman Robert Kastenmeier, then Chair of the House Committee on the Judiciary
Subcommittee on Courts, Civil Liberties and the Administration of Justice: "The argument that a
particular interest group will make more money and therefore be more creative does not
satisfy... the constitutional requirements of the intellectual property clause." Robert W.
Kastenmeier & Michael J. Remington, The Semiconductor Chip Protection Act of 1984: A Swamp
or Firm Ground?, 70 MINN. L. REV. 417, 441 (1985), quoted in Ralph S. Brown, Copyright-Like
Protection for Designs, 19 U. BALT. L. REV. 308, 323 (1989) [hereinafter Brown, Copyright-Like
Protection].
Ralph feigned outrage when a student note in the Harvard Law Review asserted that
copyright was "simply an anti-misappropriation scheme that protects the fruits of intellectual
labor." Note, Copyright Protection of Computer Program Object Code, 96 HARV. L. REv. 1723,
1741 (1983). "No such thing. Let me cite an authority that arguably outweighs the Harvard Law
Review, namely the Supreme Court of the United States," referring to Twentieth Century Music
Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975), which emphasized that although "[the immediate
effect of our copyright law is to secure a fair return for an author's creative labor.., the ultimate
aim is... to stimulate artistic creativity for the general public good." Brown, The Widening Gyre,
supra note 1, at 23.
87. Brown, Eligibility for Copyright, supra note 4, at 591-92. Ralph did, however, support the
recognition of authors' "moral rights"-rights to claim paternity and to protect the integrity of
their works. Ralph S. Brown, Adherence to the Berne Copyright Convention: The Moral Rights
Issue, 35 J. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y U.S.A. 196 (1988).
88. See Brown, Eligibility for Copyright, supra note 4, at 596; William M. Landes & Richard
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increases the cost of future works by decreasing the material otherwise
available to subsequent authors for free. 9 Ralph was particularly sensitive
to this latter cost and remained steadfast in his defense of a rich public
domain. "Relegation to the public domain will sometimes appear to be an
inferior kind of thing that happens to deserving authors and inventors when
for some reason they lose control of their creations. Viewed in another way,
the public domain is the accumulated wisdom of the ages." 90 Extravagant
protection can also produce too much incentive, diverting resources from
activities offering greater social utility. It is possible to have too much
Hamlet (or Mickey Mouse) and too little butter.9"
Despite the insights of economics, we lack a practical rule of thumb to
tell us what level of incentives will yield an optimum output of authorship.
Ralph was characteristically direct: "Thus, the lessons from economics;
they are not very helpful in hard cases."92 But the lessons do inform our
judgment, and Ralph was quick to object to propositions that seemed under
any plausible calculus to exalt private over public benefits.
One area of concern is the test for "substantial similarity" -the
standard that determines whether a defendant has taken enough from a
copyrighted work to be branded an infringer. The determination is
particularly troublesome when the copying is not literal-that is, when
there is little word-for-word or brushstroke-for-brushstroke similarity. One
test, popularized by the Ninth Circuit and now making intermittent
appearances in others, asks whether the defendant has captured "the total
concept and feel" of the copyrighted work.93 Ralph disliked the test, fearing
that it subordinated the distinction between protectable expression and
unprotectable ideas, inviting juries (and judges) to exercise their innate
prejudice against copying.' 4 In our casebook, he wondered how the "total
A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copyright Law, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 325, 326 (1989).
89. See Landes & Posner, supra note 88, at 332.
90. BROWN & DENICOLA, supra note 4, at 9.
91. This perspective forms the basis for the analysis of copyright law in Glynn S. Lunney, Jr.,
Reexamining Copyright's Incentives-Access Paradigm, 49 VAND. L. REv. 483 (1996).
92. Brown, Eligibility for Copyright, supra note 4, at 597. Ralph did not play favorites in his
judgments. He believed, for example, that copyright law did not permit the repeated dissemination
of course anthologies containing copyrighted works. "Is there anything about copyright, unlike
computers or photocopier supplies, that marks it for compulsory contributions, at one extreme to
school districts in economically depressed communities, at the other to the education of
professionals whose earnings prospects may be superior to those of many authors?" BROWN &
DENICOLA, supra note 4, at 439; see also Brown, The Joys of Copyright, supra note 3, at 480
(arguing that the Copyright Act "does not in most circumstances authorize the repeated
dissemination of anthologies that include complete copyright works").
93. The test originated in Roth Greeting Cards v. United Card Co., 429 F.2d 1106 (9th Cir.
1970); it has appeared with increased frequency following its adoption in Sid & Marty Krofft
Television Productions v. McDonald's, 562 F.2d 1157 (9th Cir. 1977).
94. Similar concerns may have contributed to Ralph's enduring admiration for Judge Learned
Hand, whose opinions shaped so much of the law of copyright and unfair competition. In a pair of
famous decisions that have become standard fare in copyright casebooks, Judge Hand brought
increased rigor to the analysis of infringement. See Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 81
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concept and feel" test could survive in light of the explicit reference to
"concept" in the Copyright Act's list of excluded subject matter?5 The
statutory denial of protection for "idea, procedure, process, system, method
of operation, concept, principle, or discovery" 9 6 was to Ralph "the most
powerful category of ineligibility for copyright." 97 The welfare losses that
would otherwise result from permitting the monopolization of ideas through
the indulgent standards of copyright and the increased burden on the
production of future works would be intolerable.9"
The intersection of copyright and freedom of speech is also
troublesome. Ralph regarded as not fully adequate the conventional
response "that the fair use privilege eases any tension," even when "further
lubricated by the freedom to appropriate facts and ideas." 99 The fair use
doctrine, essentially an invitation to recalibrate the balance between
incentive and access case by case, is constrained by economic
considerations foreign to the First Amendment. As with trademark rights in
product features, Ralph saw a solution in the neglected area of remedies.
Drawing on an earlier comment by his coauthor Benjamin Kaplan, he
argued that when free speech or other concerns weigh in favor of public
access to an infringing work, the plaintiff may properly be left to monetary
relief-a kind of judicial compulsory license.1°° "In copyright, the main
impetus toward a degree of caution in hurling injunctions is a welcome if
belated one: an understanding that the First Amendment has a lot to say to
copyright." 10 This approach was subsequently endorsed by the Supreme
Court in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, °2 but so far with too little effect.
F.2d 49 (2d Cir. 1936); Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1930). In every
edition of his casebook, Ralph accompanied these opinions with a photograph of Judge Hand. He
also paid tribute in the closing footnote of his first article, see Brown, Advertising and the Public
Interest, supra note 4, at 1206 n.170, and at his "retirement" luncheon in 1983. He observed:
"Unfair competition, when a Learned Hand holds the reins, is mindful of the competitive ideal."
Brown, The Joys of Copyright, supra note 3, at 480.
95. BROWN & DENICOLA, supra note 4, at 238 (citing 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1994)).
96. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b).
97. Brown, Eligibility for Copyright, supra note 4, at 602.
98. See Landes & Posner, supra note 88, at 348.
99. Ralph S. Brown, Civil Remedies for Intellectual Property Invasions: Themes and
Variations, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 1992, at 45, 53-54 [hereinafter Brown, Civil
Remedies]. The article begins with an expression of Ralph's "belief that, in general, we do not
pay enough attention to remedies," id. at 45, and ends on "[a] final personal note: It has been a
bizarre experience, in looking up scores of cases, mostly to be interested only in the last page or
two of an opinion," id. at 78 n.237.
100. See id. at 51-56. "Justice Benjamin Kaplan, in his inexhaustible source of good sense,
the Unhurried View of Copyright, did write that 'courts have sometimes forgotten that an
injunction does not go of course; the interest in dissemination of a work may justify a confinement
of the remedy to a money recovery (just as it may suggest the legislative use, in proper doses, of
the device of a compulsory license)."' Id. at 52 (quoting BENJAMIN KAPLAN, AN UNHURRIED
VIEW OF COPYRIGHT 73 (1967)).
101. Brown, Civil Remedies, supra note 99, at 78.
102. 510 U.S. 569, 578 n.10 (1994). The Court relied heavily on Pierre N. Leval, Toward a
Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1105 (1990), which had also influenced Ralph's thinking.
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Another battle, recently lost, concerned the extension of the copyright
term from the life of the author plus fifty years (seventy-five years from
publication for works made for hire) to life plus seventy years (and ninety-
five years for works made for hire)."0 3 Ralph considered the constitutional
requirement of a limited duration as a fundamental legitimizing constraint
on copyright.1 4 At some point, attempts to defend increased duration on
incentive grounds become implausible because of the decreasing time value
of money. "How likely is it that additional creative resources will be called
forth by the prospect of an extra twenty years of protection commencing
fifty years after the author's death?""0 5 The costs of extended duration in
terms of a diminished public domain, however, are very real, especially
since the extension applies retroactively to existing works. There is no quid
pro quo for the public in extending the length of protection for works that
have already been created, only windfalls to the owners of a few long-lived
works.
Ralph also weighed in on other copyright issues too numerous to
recount, but almost always in defense of the copier."6 His writings on
copyright, especially his casebook, have influenced three generations of
lawyers, judges, and scholars.
III. MISAPPROPRIATION
Ralph never made a complete peace with the right of publicity, a kind
of property right in the commercial value of a person's identity that sprung
from a facet of the right of privacy originally intended to help private
See e.g., Brown, Civil Remedies, supra note 99, at 53-56.
103. See Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, Pub. L. No. 105-298, 112 Stat. 2827
(1998).
104. See Brown, Copyright and Its Upstart Cousins, supra note 43, at 302.
105. BRoWN & DENICOLA, supra note 4, at 486; see also Landes & Posner, supra note 88, at
361-62 (arguing that at some point the incentive effects of extending the duration of copyright
become negligible). Even Samuel Clemens, who apparently favored perpetual copyright for
authors, thought that life plus 50 years would be enough: "'I think that will satisfy any reasonable
author, because it will take care of his children .... Let the grandchildren take care of
themselves."' Margalit Fox, The Rights of Writers As a Twain Obsession, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 16,
1998, at El. Ralph also raised the possibility of varying the length of the copyright term with the
nature of the work, a suggestion that has particular resonance as copyright expands into more
utilitarian subject matter such as computer programs and product designs. See BROvN &
DENICOLA, supra note 4, at 487.
106. Among these was his opposition to a public lending right, recognized in some European
countries, that would require compensation to authors for library lending. He dismissed the idea in
typical fashion: "If you want people to read more, you don't make it more expensive."
Establishment of Public Lending Right Explored at Recent Conference, 34 Pat. Trademark &
Copyright J. (BNA) 41, 42 (May 14, 1987) (summarizing panel discussion). Ralph had also
become increasingly interested in the issues raised by digital dissemination. He applauded the
setback suffered by former Patents and Trademarks Commissioner Bruce Lehman's protectionist
agenda at the 1996 meeting of the World Intellectual Property Organization. See Ralph S. Brown,
Academic Responses to the TRIPS!WTO Situation, 37 VA. J. INT'L L. 499,499 (1997).
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people avoid the limelight. He was uneasy because a right of publicity had
no obvious center; its underlying rationales seemed dubious, and its scope
was not constrained by the types of boundaries that legitimize copyright. 07
He thought the notion of a descendible right of publicity particularly odd.
"[Jiudicial declarations that a celebrity could keep on exclusively endorsing
Wheaties from across the Styx left troublesome questions,"'o' and Ralph
wondered if the right would persist through all eternity. Here as elsewhere
his influence can be seen in the Restatement-in its caution that the right of
publicity should be narrowly construed in light of its uncertain rationale,
10 9
its argument that post mortem rights (if any) should be narrower still,"0 and
its emphasis on First Amendment constraints."'
Ralph reserved his harshest criticism, however, for the common-law
tort of misappropriation. That doctrine is traditionally traced to the Supreme
Court's decision in International News Service v. Associated Press,"2
holding that a competitor's appropriation of news from early editions of
Associated Press newspapers constituted unfair competition under federal
common law. The Court admonished the defendant for "endeavoring to
reap where it has not sown." 1 3 Ralph was not much impressed with this
unjust enrichment rationale "flavored with scripture,""' 4 and he attacked
the doctrine for the first time in his Yale article. "Its gross fallacy is the
assumption of a general policy in favor of monopolies in ideas, systems, or
any ingenious contrivance." "' When the Restatement took a similar
position against the misappropriation tort more than four decades later, it
cited Ralph's Yale article along with like criticisms by Zechariah Chafee
and Milton Handler."6
The misappropriation tort has no center; no limiting principle restrains
it from engulfing all imitation. "There is an ethical belief that the imitator is
guilty of unjust enrichment-what an empty phrase that is!" '  "Some
people," Ralph wrote, thought that misappropriation "suggests not a
107. See Brown, Copyright and Its Upstart Cousins, supra note 43, at 302-03. Ralph
generally concurred with Judge Kozinski's dissent in White v. Samsung Electronics America, 989
F.2d 1512, 1512 (9th Cir. 1993) (Kozinski, J., dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc)
(arguing that the right of publicity was too broad, interfered with federal copyright law, and
intruded upon First Amendment rights).
108. See Brown, Copyright and Its Upstart Cousins, supra note 43, at 304.
109. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETION § 46 cmt. c (1995).
110. See id. cmt. h.
111. See id. § 47 cmts. b-d.
112. 248 U.S. 215 (1918).
113. Id. at 239.
114. Brown, Advertising and the Public Interest, supra note 4, at 1200.
115. Id.
116. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETrION § 38 reporters' note b (1995).
117. Brown, Copyright and Its Upstart Cousins, supra note 43, at 305. On the natural
inclination to grant relief against a copier, see Wendy J. Gordon, On Owning Information:
Intellectual Propeny and the Restitutionary Impulse, 78 VA. L. REV. 149, 166-70 (1992).
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euphemism for theft, but a shapeless tort that releases powerful
anticompetitive impulses," citing himself" s As an antidote to the "siren
song of misappropriation,"" 9 Ralph again invoked his coauthor Ben
Kaplan: "[Ulf man has any 'natural' rights, not the least must be a right to
imitate his fellows, and thus to reap where he has not sown." 1
20
Ralph also attacked along another front. The misappropriation tort is
not merely bad policy; it also undermines the balance struck by federal
patent and copyright law. Patent and copyright law protect intellectual
property, but they protect the public domain too, marking off matter to be
left outside the reach of private rights.' That was the essential principle of
the Sears and Compco cases, whatever their excesses in application. Ralph
embraced their sweeping pronouncements on preemption 22 and was sorry
to see them narrowed in subsequent decisions."2 He also questioned the
capacity of state courts and legislatures to safeguard the public domain and
expressed his preference for national standards. 4 When it became clear
that the general revision of the copyright law would include an express
congressional declaration of federal preemption, Ralph offered enthusiastic
support."z When the revision bill was finally adopted in 1976, Ralph
marked the occasion with a major article arguing that any ambiguities in
§ 301's assertion of federal preemptionn 6 "ought to be resolved in the
direction of more thorough unification." 7
The preemptive reach of § 301 extends to works "within the subject
matter of copyright." 28 Some have argued that this means, basically, things
protected by copyright, which in light of the Copyright Act's exclusion of
ideas and facts, 29 inseparable design features of useful articles,'13 and other
118. Brown, Unification, supra note 4, at 1100 (citing Brown, Product Simulation, supra
note 51, at 1227).
119. Brown, Copyright and Its Upstart Cousins, supra note 43, at 308.
120. Brown, Design Protection, supra note 44, at 1386 n.208 (quoting KAPLAN, supra note
100, at 2).
121. "It should be, and I believe is, a significant part of the federal scheme to leave some
interests unprotected .... Brown, Unification, supra note 4, at 1105.
122. See Brown, Product Simulation, supra note 51, at 1216-27.
123. See, e.g., Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 569-70 (1974) (upholding
state trade-secret protection for patentable subject matter); Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546,
569-70 (1973) (allowing state protection for writings left "unattended" by federal law); cf. Bonito
Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 152-58 (1989) (advancing a revisionist
view of Sears and Compco). Ralph dissected Goldstein in Ralph S. Brown, Jr., Publication and
Preemption in Copyright Law: Elegiac Reflections on Goldstein v. California, 22 UCLA L. REV.
1022 (1975) [hereinafter Brown, Publication and Preemption].
124. See Brown, Unification, supra note 4, at 1093-94; Brown, Publication and Preemption,
supra note 123, at 1050-51.
125. See Brown, Publication and Preemption, supra note 123, at 1048-51.
126. 17 U.S.C. § 301 (1994).
127. Brown, Unification, supra note 4, at 1070.
128. 17 U.S.C. § 301 (1994).
129. See id. § 102(b).
130. See id. § 101 (defining "pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works").
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sundry matters, would still leave a good deal to the states.' Ralph would
have none of it. The subject matter of copyright is as much what Congress
has assigned to the public domain as what it has protected, including "the
high-level paradise of ideas, concepts, and principles" and "the low-level
inferno of things too small or routine for copyright." 13 2 The courts are
wisely following Ralph.'33
The other question relevant to § 301 preemption is whether the state
right is "equivalent to any of the exclusive rights within the general scope
of copyright," principally the exclusive right to reproduce the work. How
should the misappropriation tort fare? A 1966 House Report stated without
equivocation that "where the cause of action involves the form of unfair
competition commonly referred to as 'misappropriation,' which is nothing
more than copyright protection under another name, section 301 is intended
to have preemptive effect."' " By 1975, however, misappropriation had
gotten a partial reprieve through the inclusion of a circular reference to
"rights against misappropriation not equivalent" to copyright on an
illustrative statutory list of non-preempted state doctrines. 35 A passage in
the 1976 House Report commented that states were free to afford relief on
facts analogous to the International News Service case.136 This revival of
misappropriation aroused the opposition of the Justice Department's
Antitrust Division, and at the last minute during floor debate the reference
to misappropriation was dropped from the preemption provision along with
the remainder of the illustrative list. 37 Ralph was pleased to see the
reference to misappropriation disappear.3 The upshot is that most cases
now sensibly hold that state misappropriation claims aimed at the subject
matter of copyright are preempted.'39 An exception for the appropriation of
"hot news," however, apparently survives as a consequence of the 1976
131. See, e.g., Bromhall v. Rorvik, 478 F. Supp. 361 (E.D. Pa. 1979) (holding that idea
protection is not preempted); I-I0 Swimwear, Ltd. v. Lomas, 560 N.Y.S.2d 19 (App. Div. 1990)
(holding that protection of inseparable features of clothing design is not preempted); Paul
Goldstein, Preempted State Doctrines, Involuntary Transfers and Compulsory Licenses: Testing
the Limits of Copyright, 24 UCLA L. REv. 1107, 1118-20 (1977).
132. Brown, Unification, supra note 4, at 1096.
133. See, e.g., National Basketball Ass'n v. Motorola, 105 F.3d 841 (2d Cir. 1997) (holding
that § 301 covers uncopyrightable as well as copyrightable elements); United States ex rel. Berge
v. Board of Trustees, 104 F.3d 1453 (4th Cir.) (holding that ideas are covered), cert. denied, 118
S. Ct. 301 (1997); ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996) (holding that facts are
covered).
134. H.R. REP. No. 89-2237, at 129 (1966).
135. S. 22, 94th Cong., § 301 (1975).
136. "[S]tate law should have the flexibility to afford a remedy (under traditional principles
of equity) against a consistent pattern of unauthorized appropriation by a competitor of the facts
(i.e., not the literary expression) constituting 'hot news' ...." H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 132
(1976).
137. See Brown, Unification, supra note 4, at 1101-02.
138. See id.
139. See, e.g., Financial Info., Inc. v. Moody's Investors Serv., 808 F.2d 204 (2d Cir. 1986);
Warner Bros. v. ABC, 720 F.2d 231 (2d Cir. 1983).
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House Report's reference to International News Service.14 This exception
pays unjustified deference to legislative history that does not reflect the
final statutory language.
IV. PROCESS AND PROSPECTS
Ralph had two principal concerns about intellectual property law,
especially about copyright. One was personal: The increasing length and
complexity of the statute made teaching copyright law a little less fun
(although he would quickly add, still vastly more enjoyable than everything
else in the curriculum). The Copyright Act,14 1 enacted in 1976 and enlarged
in almost every subsequent year, has swelled to well over six times the
length of its succinct 1909 predecessor. Although not yet the Internal
Revenue Code or the Uniform Commercial Code, it now at least rivals the
Bankruptcy Code. Ralph's second concern was more substantive: The
expansion of intellectual property rights of all kinds seems relentless. The
concerns are related. Both are consequences, at least in part, of the unusual
process of private negotiation that has come to dominate the making of
federal intellectual property law. 42
It is tempting to attribute the recent expansion of private rights to the
size and political power of trademark and copyright owners. It was no
coincidence, for example, that the twenty-year extension of the copyright
term came in time to save Mickey Mouse from falling into the public
domain in 2004,143 but this political explanation may be more generally true
for trademark than for copyright. Copyright users are often as big and well-
organized as copyright owners, and even when users are small, like
businesses using radio broadcasts to pacify customers, their geographic
dispersion provides a political base that many copyright industries,
concentrated like the music business in just a few states, are hard pressed to
match." The users of others' trademarks, however, are less likely to be
140. See National Basketball Ass'n v. Motorola, 105 F.3d 841 (2d Cir. 1997) (finding,
however, that the "hot news" exception was so small as to exclude the distribution on defendant's
pager system of game facts extracted from radio and television broadcasts of NBA games).
141. I include the entirety of Title 17 of the United States Code, although Chapters 9 through
13 are not technically "copyright."
142. Ralph was concerned too with the expansion of intellectual property rights under state
law. To rein in those developments, he counted heavily on federal preemption. See supra text
accompanying notes 121-140.
143. Donald Duck, Goofy, and Pluto would have followed soon after. Disney and the
Gershwin Family Trust, along with the American Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers
and the Motion Picture Association of America, were among those lobbying for the extension.
Sabra Chartrand, Congress Has Extended Its Protection for Goofy and Gershwin, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 19, 1998, at C2.
144. See, e.g., Fairness in Music Licensing Act, Pub. L. No. 105-298, 112 Stat. 2830 (1998)
(expanding the public reception exemption).
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either influential or sympathetic. 45 But whatever the imbalance in political
power between owners and users of intellectual property, it is too
longstanding to account for the recent rush toward protection.
A more promising explanation may be the increasing globalization of
intellectual property law. The United States is the largest exporter of
intellectual property, not only of works and inventions protected by
copyright and patent, but also of the selling power of famous trademarks.
When the level of intellectual property protection abroad exceeds the
protection available here, American works sold in those markets are
sometimes limited on a reciprocity basis to the protection available in the
United States. This was the principal argument favoring the extension of
our copyright term to match the life-plus-seventy year term in the European
Union (which itself had matched the German term, once the longest in
Europe), thereby gaining twenty additional years of foreign royalties for
American exporters of music and movies.146 Even when our domestic
protection exceeds foreign norms, increases are praised as displays of good
faith that strengthen our bargaining position in negotiations aimed at
elevating protection for American works abroad. 47 Increased protection
may seem deceptively cheap when foreigners are paying part of the bill.
The shape of modem intellectual property law, however, may ultimately
owe as much to process as to policy.
In a 1987 article that influenced Ralph's thinking on the future of
copyright, Jessica Litman described the legislative process that produced
the 1976 Copyright Act: "Members of Congress revised the copyright law
by encouraging negotiations between interests affected by copyright, by
trusting those negotiations to produce substantive compromises, and by
ultimately enacting those compromises into law." ' To replace the
outmoded 1909 Act, Congress needed a bill that would not be opposed by
too many of the interest groups concerned with copyright. It got what it
wanted by pressing the major parties to draft provisions that they could all
support. The resulting agreements became law. Similar delegations are now
145. Cf. Brown, Advertising and the Public Interest, supra note 4, at 1202-05 (making the
same point with respect to the judicial process).
146. See, e.g., 141 CONG. REC. E379 (daily ed. Feb. 16, 1995) (statement of Rep. Moorhead);
Orrin G. Hatch, Toward a Principled Approach to Copyright Legislation at the Turn of the
Millennium, 59 U. PrrT. L. REV. 719, 729-32 (1998). Similar arguments have been made to
support expansion of the public performance right for sound recordings. See WORKING GROUP ON
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE TASK FORCE,
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE NATIONAL INFRAsTRUcTURE 222-23 (1995).
147. This from a nation that for much of its history practically celebrated its reputation as a
pirate. See BROWN & DENICOLA, supra note 4, at 799-817.
148. Jessica Litman, Copyright, Compromise, and Legislative History, 72 CORNELL L. REV.
857, 903 (1987) [hereinafter Litman, Copyright, Compromise, and Legislative History]; see also
Jessica Litman, Copyright Legislation and Technological Change, 68 OR. L. REv. 275 (1989)




commonplace.149 Their defining characteristic is the absence of an
independent congressional evaluation of the substance of the negotiated
agreements.15
Superficially at least, this process resembles a series of contract
negotiations. As Professor Litman demonstrates, since the negotiators are
dividing the pie only among themselves, we can expect a pattern of broad
rights limited by narrow exceptions tailored to the particular users at the
table-an outcome generally favorable to owners. 15' But we can also
predict that these agreements destined to become law will have other
distinctive characteristics. The parties know that they will be unable to
adjust their agreement to reflect future developments; unlike a contract, a
statute cannot be modified or rescinded by mutual consent. They also
cannot rely on the usual default rules of contract law, such as the obligation
of good faith, to fill in interstices and temper abusive behavior. Further,
they must anticipate a different mode of interpretation. Interpretation of
contracts centers on the intent of the parties, but statutory construction
imports a broader perspective.
Each of these considerations weighs in favor of agreements that press
the limits of foresight and draftsmanship, leaving unspecified as little as
possible. To minimize the risk that their division of the spoils will be
disturbed by judges with broader perspectives, the parties are also likely to
favor rules over standards. These dynamics have unfortunate consequences.
The agreements, and so the statutes, are likely to be long and detailed (and
less fun to teach). Their elaborate rules, often unresponsive to the practical
needs and intuitions of ordinary users, may reduce public respect for
intellectual property law, creating an attitude of cynicism, even defiance.
The proliferation of technical rules also diminishes the ability of judges to
affect the shape of intellectual property law. Courts, where one party or the
other usually finds it expedient to focus on the public interest, can have
advantages over legislatures lobbied hard by well-off owners and a few
149. See, for example, the negotiated resolution of on-line service provider liability described
in Industry Groups Reach Accord on Online Copyright Liability Legislation, 55 Pat. Trademark &
Copyright J. (BNA) 557 (Apr. 9, 1998). The compromise was enacted as part of the Digital
Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998). See also the negotiations
on the digital transmission performance right for sound recordings described in Amended
Performance Rights Bill Reflects Industry Compromise, 50 Pat. Trademark & Copyright J. (BNA)
244, 244-46 (July 13, 1995), enacted in Pub. L. No. 104-39, 109 Stat. 336 (1995).
150. "Congress in effect agreed that if the industry representatives would invest the time and
energy to develop a bill that all of them endorsed, Congress would refrain from exercising
independent judgment on the substance of the legislation." Litman, Copyright Legislation and
Technological Change, supra note 148, at 314-15; see also Litman, Copyright, Compromise, and
Legislative History, supra note 148, at 870-79 (describing congressional deference to industry
compromises).
151. See Litman, Copyright Legislation and Technological Change, supra note 148, at 320-
23.
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well-organized users.152 The preference for rigid rules over general
principles effectively deprives intellectual property law of the moderating
influence of a detached judicial perspective, even as Congress increasingly
declines its own opportunity to exercise independent oversight.
Can the balance be restored? Under the current regime, the negotiating
table must at least seat as many as possible. Ralph was pleased, for
example, that education and library representatives had become active
participants in the process. 53 But bargaining among interest groups, even
when there are many of them, yields only a poor approximation of the
broader public interest.154 Increasing the number of participants is likely to
produce only additional narrow exceptions; it cannot itself hold the center.
Ralph's solution was to facilitate a return to past practice, when
legislators rather than private negotiators were the primary arbiters of
public policy.' He knew no one could compel legislators to exercise
independent judgment over the handiwork of interest groups, but he hoped
at least to insure that they had the capacity to do it, and thus, perhaps, an
increased interest in doing it. That educational responsibility fell chiefly on
academics, through their scholarship certainly, but more immediately
through public speaking, and better still through testimony on pending
legislation. Ralph was always willing to do his part. He accepted as many
speaking engagements as he could and testified before Congress whenever
he had (or created) an opportunity.56 For those who had the good fortune to
know Ralph Brown, it is not surprising that he placed his hopes on
education. Teaching was his profession, pursued for more than half a
century in the classroom, in his casebook, and in his articles and speeches.
Few have done it with more skill and grace.
152. "Congress, more overtly than the courts, sometimes does no more than respond to
pressure groups." Brown, Eligibility for Copyright, supra note 4, at 593.
153. See, e.g., 144 CONG. REc. S4885 (daily ed. May 14, 1998) (statement of Sen. Hatch);
Commerce Panel Delays Action on Digital Copyright Legislation, 55 Pat. Trademark & Copyright
J. (BNA) 238 (June 25, 1998).
154. See Litman, Copyright Legislation and Technological Change, supra note 148, at 311-
14.
155. As a model of his aspirations for legislators, Ralph would no doubt suggest former
Representative Robert Kastemneier, longtime Chair of the House Judiciary Committee's
Subcommittee on Courts, Civil Liberties and the Administration of Justice (with jurisdiction over
intellectual property legislation). To Ralph, he was "a true statesman in this field." Brown,
Copyright-Like Protection, supra note 86, at 323. In Ralph's contribution to a symposium in
Kastenmeier's honor, he noted the Chairman's "imprint on major legislation" but concluded with
what for Ralph was more telling praise. "Just as important, he used his position to discourage
unwise proposals." Brown, Civil Remedies, supra note 99, at 45.
156. Ralph was one of the few witnesses to testify in opposition to the 1988 trademark
revision bill, which at the time included a federal dilution provision. In addition to substance, he
characteristically complained about the bill's "very skimpy consideration" by Congress. House
Panel Hears Views on Trademark Act Revision, supra note 26, at 490; see also House Panel
Hears Testimony on Design Protection Legislation, 36 Pat. Trademark & Copyright J. (BNA)
242, 243 (June 30, 1988) (summarizing Ralph's testimony opposing broad design protection
legislation).
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